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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over final orders of the Public Service Commission 
(Commission) pursuant to Utah Code §78-2-2(3)(e)(i) (2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Commission will rely upon the Statement of Issues given in the Opening Brief of the 
Committee of Consumer Services. 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following provisions of the Utah Code are determinative of the issues presented on 
appeal: Utah Code §§54-3-1 (1977) and 54-4-4 (1975). Because both of these sections are 
contained in the Addendum, at Tab C, of the Opening Brief of the Committee of Consumer 
Services, they are not reproduce here. Additionally, the Commission believes Utah Code §54-4-
1 (1975) has application. It provides as follows: 
The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and 
regulate every public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the business of 
every such public utility in this state, and to do all things, whether herein 
specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient in 
the exercise of such power and jurisdiction; provided, however, that the 
Department of Transportation shall have jurisdiction over those safety functions 
transferred to it by the Department of Transportation Act. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Commission will rely upon the Statement of the Case presented in the Opening Brief 
of the Committee of Consumer Services (Committee). Because the records associated with this 
appeal and the issues raised on appeal derive from three Commission proceedings, this brief will 
use this record reference convention: Material contained in the record compiled in Supreme 
Court Case Number 2000 76 (PSC Docket No. 98-057-12) will be identified as u2000-76 
Record." Material contained in the record compiled in Supreme Court Case Number 2000 893 
(PSC Docket No. 99-057-20) will be identified as "2000-893 Record." This Court previously 
consolidated Supreme Court Case No. 2002 810 (PSC Docket Nos. 98-057- 12[on remand] and 
01-057-14) with Case No. 2000 893. While a record has been complied for Case No. 2002 810, 
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no reference has been made in this Brief, nor that of the Committee, to any material contained in 
that record. To further help identify referenced material cited in this brief, each reference will 
identify the record index's page number given to the relevant record document, followed by the 
index's description of the document, followed by the document's internal pagination, if 
applicable, where the referenced material may be found. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
The Committee and CUC/Salt Lake CAP claim that the decision to construct a C02 
processing plant and have Questar Gas contribute to the recovery of plant operation costs was an 
imprudent accommodation of Questar Gas' interests to its affiliate Questar Pipeline's interests. 
They argue that the Questar companies should have pursued alternative courses of action. These 
alternative courses, however, would just as easily be claimed to be an imprudent accommodation 
of Questar Pipeline's interests (and those of other natural gas transporters on the Questar 
Pipeline) to Questar Gas' interests. Whether the process of deciding to build and building the 
C02 processing plant was or was not improperly influenced by affiliate interests, does not avoid 
the fact that processing Coal Seam gas was the only viable alternative permitting Questar Gas to 
continue to provide safe natural gas utility service to all of its customers. Other alternatives to 
processing Coal Seam gas were not reasonable. Where customers benefit from necessary actions, 
cost recovery is not precluded, even if the process to reach the necessary action is flawed. 
The cost recovery permitted by the stipulation, adopted in the Commission's final Report 
and Order, approximated the cost recovery that could have resulted from various alternative 
courses of action urged by the parties. Under the terms adopted, Questar Gas customers receive 
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the benefits of the necessary ameliorative action addressing their unique needs and contribute to a 
portion of its associated costs. The remaining costs are borne by the Questar companies. It is 
reasonable for the Commission to accept a stipulation that is equivalent to the results that would 
be obtained from possible alternatives and avoids a result that could result in higher costs being 
incurred by customers. Requiring the Commission to only accept unanimously supported 
stipulations improperly confers governmental powers to a private party and is not consistent with 
this Court's precedent. This later point was not preserved for argument on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POSSIBLE ERRORS IN UTILITY DECISION MAKING DO NOT 
PRECLUDE RECOVERY OF COSTS INCURRED FOR A NECESSARY 
AND BENEFICIAL OUTCOME 
The essence of the arguments presented by the Committee and CUC/Salt Lake CAP is 
that they disagree with a cost recovery decision made by the Commission. A utility regulator's 
assignment of cost recovery from a group or groups of individuals/entities, from the universe of 
potential cost recovery contributors, is the quintessential legislative/regulatory function 
performed in utility regulation. The decision made by the Commission is within its regulatory 
powers and is not arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion. 
The Committee and CUC/Salt Lake CAP transpose criticism of the manner by which they 
characterize QGC having resolved the gas quality/safety issue to the Commission's decision on 
the same. The distinction intended by the Commission's argument is illustrated by consideration 
of the following hypothetical, based on what the Committee's and CUC/Salt Lake CAP's 
arguments and positions would view as behavior uncomplicated by affiliate transactions. A 
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natural gas distribution company, like Questar Gas, is the major customer of an unaffiliated 
interstate natural gas pipeline company. Historically, the gas distribution company's own natural 
gas production and natural gas purchased from other suppliers had a high Btu content and a low 
inert substance content, including C02. The gas distribution company transported these gas 
supplies through the federally regulated services offered by the pipeline company. Over time, 
other sources (producing wells) of natural gas become available in the areas served by the 
pipeline company, but these other sources produce natural gas with a higher C02 content than 
that previously shipped, but still within the pipeline's natural gas quality standards. The total 
inert content of this higher C02 gas is also within the quality standards of other interstate 
pipelines interconnected with the interstate pipeline. While the natural gas distribution company 
continues to submit low C02 content natural gas for transportation, other shippers place the 
higher C02 content natural gas on the pipeline for transport. These other shippers can utilize the 
higher C02 content natural gas for their purposes as it is; the gas meets their standards and, if 
further transported beyond the pipeline's area on other interstate pipelines, the other pipelines' 
standards. The pipeline operates its utility plant in various manners to permit the natural gas 
delivered to the gas distribution company's points of delivery on the pipeline system to meet the 
distribution company's unaltered, historical standards. With time, however, the quantity of higher 
C02 content natural gas increases such that the pipeline's past actions no longer suffice to permit 
delivery of natural gas having a sufficiently low C02 content to the distribution company's points 
of delivery. The gas distribution company and its customers can not easily accommodate a 
different C02 level, because of the costs to reset their appliances and the speed by which such 
changes can be made. The higher C02 content presents, however, a safety concern for the 
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distribution company and its customers through its combustion in their unaltered appliances. The 
pipeline faces a choice between providing C02 processing of the higher C02 content natural gas 
or refusing to transport the other shippers's higher C02 content natural gas. Refusing to transport 
the higher C02 content natural gas is rejected. Such action would be contrary to federal policy 
regarding interstate pipeline operation and such action would not allow the pipeline to deliver 
sufficient quantities of natural gas to some of the gas distribution company's points of delivery. 
The pipeline requests proposals and ultimately contracts with an unaffiliated processing company 
to provide processing services of the higher C02 content gas in a new plant to be owned and 
operated by the unaffiliated processing company. The pipeline company now seeks recovery of 
its increased costs, which now include C02 processing costs, from its transportation customers 
through its regulated rates. 
The hypothetical presents the same regulatory decision addressed by the Commission 
below, C02 processing costs have been incurred and a regulatory agency must decide who should 
pay those costs. The possible choices in the two scenarios are the same, natural gas producers or 
other gas owners who ship on the pipeline, the pipeline (and some permutation of its customer 
groups, which include the producers/gas owners and the gas distribution company) and the gas 
distribution company (and some permutation of its customer groups). The Committee and 
CUC/Salt Lake CAP would argue that the process by which these two scenarios arrived at the 
decision to process natural gas requires a different result in the two scenarios. This is not the 
case. 
That the Questar scenario is fraught with affiliate transactions or interests, compared with 
the hypothetical, does not change the fact that processing the natural gas was the only alternative 
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available. To say that the higher C02 content gas could have and should have been refused is too 
short an answer. Efforts to shut in or to refuse to accept the higher C02 content gas was not a 
viable option. Physically, the gas would have arrived at the pipeline for transport. No party 
contradicted Questar Gas evidence that, if Questar companies had not done so, other companies 
or the gas producers themselves would have constructed intermediate pipeline facilities which 
would then have brought the higher C02 content gas to the Questar interstate pipeline. E.g., 
2000-893 Record 581-83, Exhibits QGC 9R, 9.1R and 9.2R, Rebuttal Testimony of John P. 
Snider and 2000-893 Record 756, Transcript of June 6, 2000, Hearing, pages 233-38. 
It is intellectually stimulating to consider whether the interstate pipeline could have 
refused or would have been permitted to refuse transport of the higher C02 content gas, either 
outright or unless it was altered to meet Questar Gas' standards. Some parties, below, attempted 
to predict what the outcome of that might have been. The higher C02 content gas could not be 
directly rejected, it met the pipeline's FERC approved standards. Some parties suggested that the 
pipeline or Questar Gas could have initiated a FERC proceeding to gain FERC approval of 
different gas standards to equal those of Questar Gas. E.g., 2000-76 Record 180, Direct 
Testimony of Darrell S. Hanson, page 11. This position was countered with evidence that the 
FERC likely would not agree to change the pipeline's standards. This counterview was based 
upon FERC's interstate pipeline regulatory goals: 1. The FERC pursued an open access policy. It 
desired that interstate pipeline transportation be as open as possible for all potential shippers 
without discrimination. More restrictive pipeline gas standards would run counter to FERC's 
open access goal. 2. The pipeline's standards were already comparable to the standards of other 
interconnecting interstate pipelines. The higher C02 content gas could be delivered to other 
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interstate pipeline gas standards without any additional processing. It also could be used by other 
gas distribution companies without further processing. E.g., 2000-76 Record 89, Prepared 
Testimony of Alan K. Allred, pages 3-4 
Processing to remove C02 was not necessary for any interstate market purposes; it was 
needed only to meet Questar Gas' uniquely high BTU and C02 content standards.1 Higher 
pipeline standards would reduce access to the pipeline and transportation opportunities, counter 
to the FERC's policy, and was only needed for Questar Gas, not for other transporters or users of 
gas transported on the pipeline. This is the necessary complement of the Committee's and 
CUC/Salt Lake CAP's view of Questar Gas' improper affiliate interest accommodation of 
Questar Pipeline's interests. Other shippers on Questar pipeline would object to the proffered 
alternative efforts, impacting other shippers' transportation abilities, costs and interests, as an 
improper affiliate driven effort to ameliorate Questar Gas' situation stemming from its unique 
standards for natural gas. These other shippers did not 'cause' any problem. From this view, 
causation comes from Questar Gas' unique gas standards. Any efforts to change pipeline 
standards or implement C02 processing services, is done solely to address Questar Gas' unique 
needs. See, e.g., 2000-76 Record 89, Prepared Testimony of Alan K. Allred, pages 8-10; 2000-76 
Record 139, Rebuttal Testimony of Branko Terzic, pages 2-9. 
Additionly, rather than directly altering the pipeline's standards to avoid the Coal Seam 
Processing the higher C02 content gas did not make the gas actually comply with 
Questar Gas' uniquely high BTU content standard. The processing did make the gas compatible 
with the combustion capabilities of Questar Gas' customers' unchanged appliances without 
safety concerns. Thus processing resolved the safety problems faced by Questar Gas customers, 
even though the gas still would not meet Questar Gas' BTU content standard. E.g., 2000-76 
Record 126, Testimony of Gary DeBernardi, pages 4-5, and 2000-76 Record. 107, Testimony of 
George K. Schroeder, pages 1-10. 
10 
gas, it was suggested that the pipeline could have invoked a provision found in its transportation 
terms and conditions, section 13.5, which was said to permit the pipeline to refuse to transport 
gas if doing so caused difficulties for other transporters. E.g., 2000-893 Record 918, Direct 
Testimony of Darrell S. Hanson. Questar Gas responded to this point in noting that applying 
section 13.5, to restrict Coal Seam gas transport, would then set the stage that the section could 
be used to restrict the transportation of Questar Gas' own gas supplies, causing a greater 
detriment in Questar Gas' ability to serve its customers and greatly increase the rates its 
customers would pay for their gas supplies. E.g., 2000-893 Record 759, Transcript of June 23, 
2000, Hearing, pages 1021-22. From the record evidence available, the Commission was unable 
to resolve what the definitive FERC outcome would have been. Nor whether the Questar 
companies' decision to forego the various FERC possibilities was influenced by their affiliate 
relations or a conclusion that a Questar Gas beneficial outcome would result. 2000-893 Record 
709, August 11, 2000, Report and Order, page 34. 
Importantly, however, no party challenged Questar Gas' evidence that service to parts of 
its distribution system would falter if the higher C02 content gas were refused transport on the 
pipeline. See, 2000-893 Record 709, August 11, 2000, Report and Order, page 34; and, e.g., 
2000-893 Record 759, Transcript of June 23, 2000, Hearing, pages 1044-45. The Commission 
could not make believe that some alternative, other than processing the gas, would have 
permitted QGC to continue to provide adequate utility service throughout its service territory. 
See, U.S. West Communications v. Public Service Commission, 901 P.2d 270, 274, 275 (Utah 
1995) (Commission erred in ignoring, without explanation, uncontroverted evidence). 
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While the Questar scenario is tinged with concerns of affiliate dealings or conflicts of 
interest, this does not obviate the necessary and only action possible, that processing the natural 
gas was the only alternative available to provide adequate utility service to Questar Gas' 
customers and address the safety concerns. Even if the process by which Questar Gas and its 
affiliates reached this point were flawed (or imprudent to use the lexicon of the Committee and 
CUC/Salt Lake CAP), it obtained the same result that necessarily would have been obtained if an 
unflawed or prudent process had been followed. In either scenario, the question still remains of 
who should cover the costs of the only action that was available to ensure continued safe utility 
service to all of Questar Gas' customers. The Commission has not been able to discover any 
statutory authority or case law that directs than even if the utility's process to reach a necessary 
result is flawed, there can be no recovery of costs incurred to obtain the necessary result. C.f.y 
e.g., Williams Natural Gas Co., Docket No. RP95-136-000, 85 F.E.R.C. 1(61,285, *62,137; 1998 
FERC LEXIS 2377, **25 (November 25, 1998)(error in methodology used to allocate holding 
company expenses among affiliates does not result in denial of recovery of the holding company 
costs beneficial to the utility affiliate). The Commission contends that such an outcome would 
not be just and reasonable. 
The seeming conclusion of the Committee's and CUC/Salt Lake Cap's position is that 
although the customers of Questar Gas receive the benefits of the only alternative that would 
allow Questar Gas to continue to provide uninterrupted and safe utility service2, legally, the 
2An additional alternative was technically available, but not reasonably selected. The 
customers of QGC could have altered their appliances to burn the natural gas actually delivered 
to the distribution system's interconnection points with the pipeline. No party below seriously 
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customers of Questar Gas may not be required to make any contribution. The dispute below was 
not so much that the parties believed that processing the gas was not beneficial, or not necessary 
to the continued provision of safe utility service by QGC, but who should bear the costs to obtain 
the processing benefits. The Committee and CUC/Salt Lake CAP argue that what they perceive 
as problems with the process, by which the Questar companies reached the decision to build and 
operate the C02 processing plant, precludes any C02 plant cost recovery assignment to Questar 
Gas' customers. They cite no precedent for their conclusion. C.f.y Connecticut Yankee Atomic 
Power Company, Docket No. ER97-913-000, 84 F.E.R.C. ^63,009, *65,112-113; 1998 FERC 
LEXIS 1705, **84-91 (August 31, 1998)(detriments/costs of imprudent utility decision to close a 
nuclear generating facility are netted with benefits/savings resulting from the imprudent 
decision). 
The Commission was presented with record evidence which offered various alternatives 
proposed by the parties, each of which entailed the use of a C02 processing plant.3 The parties' 
dispute was centered on the ultimate costs that Questar Gas' customers would bear in the various 
alternatives. The two ends of the spectrum were represented by the Committee's no cost and 
Questar Gas' full contractual amount alternatives. The other alternatives, between these two 
extremes, were approximately equivalent, in dollar amount, to the level of cost recovery provided 
challenged QGC's evidence that this course would cost customers over $100 million; a multiple 
of the costs associated with the C02 processing alternative. Nor that such a course would not be 
accomplished in a time frame that did not entail exposure of customers to actual safety problems; 
whereas the processing alternative could, and was, obtained in a time frame that permitted 
uninterrupted service without the safety concerns. No party contended that this course should 
have been selected or followed. 
3With the exception of the alternative noted in footnote 2. 
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for in the stipulation presented by the Division and Questar Gas Company. E.g., 2000-893 
Record 759, Transcript of June 23, 2000, Hearing, pagesl026-57. There was no clear evidence 
that any of the alternatives presented was the single, legally required result that would come from 
any FERC proceeding on the issue; assuming that the FERC would have dealt with the issue. 
From the Commission's view and determination, although it could not predict exactly 
what the FERC result would have been, the more persuasive evidence was that some cost 
responsibility would be assigned to Questar Gas, rather than no cost responsibility whatsoever. 
Evidence was presented that the stipulation offered by the Division and Questar Gas represented 
an appropriate compromise that approximated the same amount that would have resulted from 
various FERC alternative outcomes presented by the parties. It also avoided the imposition of the 
alternative that would have placed greater (full) cost recovery responsibility upon Questar Gas 
and its customers. The stipulation limited recovery to a maximum of $5 million per year, while 
actual operating expenses were projected to be and had been greater than that capped amount 
(above $7 million on an annualized basis). Expenses greater than the capped amount are borne 
entirely by Questar companies and not Questar Gas' customers. Based upon the record evidence, 
the Commission's acceptance of the stipulation represents an approximation of the likely cost 
recovery outcome that would have been required from Questar Gas and its customers for the 
benefits obtained from the only operational alternative that allowed continued, safe provision of 
service to all of Questar Gas' customers. 
UNIQUE CUC/SALT LAKE CAP ARGUMENT 
CUC/Salt Lake CAP's brief identifies three points of argument on appeal. Points A and C 
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are in substance or by actual adoption, respectively, the arguments and positions advanced by the 
Committee. Point B is unique to CUC/Salt Lake CAP. Although Point B is titled "The PSC has 
no statutory authority to accept stipulations by some, but not all of the parties to a rate increase 
proceeding," only the last paragraph addresses the titular heading of the point. The other 
paragraphs contained in the point represent a misunderstanding of the evidence presented in the 
proceedings; and their substance is akin to the issues brought forth in Points A and C. Claiming 
unavailable record evidence to answer proposed questions, these paragraphs ignore evidence 
introduced on gas supplies and pipeline capabilities. E.g., 2000-893 Record 759, Transcript of 
June 23, 2000, pages 1036-46, and 2000-76 Record 89, Prepared Testimony of Alan K. Allied, 
pages 8-11. 
The Brief text attempts to criticize the Commission's decision and stipulation's terms, 
which could effectively allow recovery of approximately 68% of processing costs, as "show[ing] 
how increasingly bizarre this decision is." Brief, pages 6, (footnote 4) and 9. The attempted 
critique is based upon a misunderstanding of the reference point used in each percentage; 
confusing two different percentages as applying to the same thing. The Division testimony, given 
as the basis for this aspect, was directed to the possible outcome if the FERC were to address 
recovery of the C02 processing costs. The Division evidence expressed a view of the possibility 
that the FERC would permit Questar Pipeline to recover C02 processing costs through FERC 
regulated rates. The Division explained that if the FERC were to follow a typical rate design, 
allocating cost recovery on the gas volumes transported by the pipeline's customers, that Questar 
Gas would then be allocated approximately 68% of the C02 processing costs through such a rate 
design. E.g., 2000-893 Record 756, Transcript of June 23, 2000, Hearing, pages 1055-56. 
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CUC/Salt Lake CAP's point confuses the later, end result, percentage of processing costs the 
FERC rate design would assign to Questar Gas, with a different probability on the FERC 
undertaking a proceeding that could result in Questar Gas being assigned C02 processing cost 
responsibility. 
On the actual substance of the point, that the Commission cannot accept a non-consensus 
supported stipulation, the point was not preserved for appeal. Utah Code §54-7-15(2)(b) (1987) 
states that "no applicant may urge or rely on any ground not set forth in the application [for 
Commission review or rehearing] in an appeal to any court." CUC/Salt Lake CAP did not file 
any application for review or rehearing by the Commission after issuance of the August 11, 2000, 
Report and Order. The Committee filed such a petition/application, but the Committee's Petition 
does not raise any point on the ability of the Commission to approve a stipulation that is not 
supported by all parties in the Commission proceedings. 2000-893 Record 737, Petition of the 
Committee of Consumer Services for Reconsideration, pages 1-9.4 Procedurally, the point and 
any argument thereon is precluded. 
Besides the procedural preclusion, the point is flawed in its merits. In Stewart, et al. v. 
Public Service Commission, 885'P.2d 759 (Utah 1994), this Court held unconstitutional a 
statutory delegation of power allowing a utility to reject a Commission ordered regulatory plan. 
The Court noted that the exercise of the governmental power to veto the Commission's exercise 
of legislative power cannot be wielded by a private party. Id., at 115-111, Acceptance of the 
CUC/Salt Lake CAP's position on this point would give to a private party the ability to thwart 
4The Intermountain Municipal Gas Agency filed a Request for Clarification, 2000-893 
Record 738, but that pleading did not raise any point on the Commission's adoption of the 
stipulation on C02 processing costs. 
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the exercise of legislative powers. A private party, for its own private interest, would be able to 
prevent the Commission from accepting and adopting a proposed stipulation simply by refusing 
to sign-on to a stipulation which could otherwise be accepted in the public interest. The 
reasoning of this Court in Stewart, supra, requires that this Court reject this point. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's acceptance of the stipulation allowing some recovery of C02 
processing costs is within its statutory ratemaking powers. Processing Coal Seam gas was the 
only action which would allow Questar Gas to provide uninterrupted, safe utility service to all 
customers in its service territory. The amount of processing costs recovered from Questar Gas 
and its customers is comparable to the amount that could have been allowed in various 
predictions of what a FERC resolution could have been. The Commission's resolution of the 
issue should be affirmed. 
Submitted this C^ day of December, 2002. 
Attorney for the Public Service Commission of Utah 
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